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Most ambidexterity theories deal with managing exploration-exploitation tradeoffs among business units 
within firms or between alliance partners, but these theories remain yet to be extended to the buyer-supplier 
relationship level. Through an in-depth case study of the Toyota Motor Corporation we illustrate how buying 
firms can simultaneously achieve short-term and long-term benefits with their long-standing suppliers. 
Taking two inherently different activities as a starting point – mass production with its focus on exploitation 
and product development with its focus on exploration, we show that the deliberate use of ambiguity and 
explicitness can function as a countervailing mechanism against overemphasizing either exploration or 
exploitation. We also show that structural separation and structural integration are two organizational 
systems which can be used by buying firms to help suppliers realize ambidexterity in their operations. 
Finally, we argue that ‘requisite security’ can help to motivate suppliers to address the paradoxical tensions 




Long-term buyer-supplier relationships have attracted considerable attention from organizational theorists 
who argue for their superior effectiveness, in light of the limitations of short-term, purely price-based 
relationships (Adler 2001). Studies of Japanese automotive manufacturers have shown that long-term buyer-
supplier relationships contribute to competitive advantages by lowering transaction costs (Dyer and Chu 
2003, Sako and Helper 1998), and fostering knowledge sharing routines (Dyer and Hatch 2006, Dyer and 
Nobeoka 2000). In the age of intensified competition, however, there is growing recognition that short-term 
price-based relationships must co-exist with long-term buyer-supplier ones, such as Japanese keiretsu 
(Ahmadjian and Lincoln 2001, Aoki and Lennerfors 2013b, MacDuffie and Helper 2006). Regardless of 
this, theories of the management of buyer-supplier relationships are largely framed in terms of tradeoffs 
(either/or), and do not fully consider the benefits of a paradoxical (both/and) perspective (e.g. Schad et al. 
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2016; Smith and Lewis 2011). 
This paper aims to narrow the gap by leveraging the concept of ambidexterity to the analysis of buyer-
supplier relationships, and by developing theoretical insights into ambidexterity in inter-organizational 
relationships (IOR). Ambidexterity refers to the ability to manage the tradeoff between exploration and 
exploitation to excel at both simultaneously (Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). 
Most studies have developed theories of how firms achieve ambidexterity within the organization, but few 
have focused on ambidexterity at the IOR level (Birkinshaw and Gupta 2013, Im and Rai 2008). Those that 
do have mainly discussed performance implications from alliance portfolios, and suggest that firms can 
more easily balance exploration and exploitation by using alliances for different purposes, e.g. alliances 
with R&D-oriented partners for exploration, and alliances with commercialization-oriented partners for 
exploitation (Kauppila 2010, Lavie et al. 2011, Rothaermel 2001, Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). Still, little 
is known about how organizations manage the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in a long-term relationship 
with the same partner that has both exploratory and exploitative domains. We ask through which distinctive 
mechanisms buyers can encourage and enable their long-standing suppliers to excel at both exploration and 
exploitation, and simultaneously achieve short-term and long-term benefits from the relationship.  
In order to address this question, we collected in-depth data on Toyota and its supplier relationships. 
Toyota provides a valuable empirical context as it systematically embeds paradoxical thinking in its 
strategies and practices (Osono et al. 2008, Spare and Bowen 1999), and simultaneously achieves higher 
customer value, e.g. higher product quality (Fujimoto 1999) and higher operational efficiency, e.g. lower 
Work in Progress/Sales Ratio (Lieberman and Dhawan 2005) than competitors. Toyota, thus, occupies what 
Porter (1996) termed the productivity frontier position which represents sustained competitive advantage in 
a given industry. Given limited firm resources, it is inherently difficult to achieve simultaneously high 
customer value (by exploration) and high operational efficiency (by exploitation) (March 1991). Past studies 
have suggested that Toyota is better able to manage this tradeoff with suppliers because of long-standing, 
trustful relationships with them (e.g. Fujimoto 1999, Liker 2004). At the same time, Toyota’s keiretsu has 
successfully responded to the need to move towards more market-oriented relationships (Aoki and 
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Lennerfors 2013a, 2013b), as exemplified by the launch of the CCC21 (Construction of Cost 
Competitiveness for the 21st Century) program in 2000 (MacDuffie and Helper 2006). Under CCC21, 
Toyota demanded an unprecedented 30% cost reduction in three years from long-standing suppliers with 
excellent development capabilities (FOURIN 2000). This raises questions about how suppliers were 
motivated to make such steep cuts and still continue to make long-term investment in developing products 
for Toyota. Our study aims to shed more light on Toyota’s ambidextrous management of long-standing 
supplier relationships and how it ensures its sustained position at the productivity frontier. 
Over a period of fourteen years (2003-2016) we conducted more than 170 interviews at Toyota 
headquarters and at its domestic and overseas plants, and also at Toyota’s long-standing suppliers. Our 
findings reveal distinct mechanisms through which suppliers can countervail overemphasis on either 
exploration or exploitation. They include a deliberate mix of ambiguity and explicitness in goal formulation 
and implementation, and also organizational systems that help suppliers achieve ambidextrous results 
through both the structural separation and the integration of internal functions. The mechanisms are used 
differently for mass production than for product development. We also identified the role of ‘requisite 
security’ in reducing excessive pressure on suppliers from buyer paradoxical demands, and in encouraging 
suppliers’ management teams to address challenges posed by these demands at both the mass production 
and the product development phases. We explore a model of ambidexterity in buyer-supplier relationships, 
provide several observations that take into account boundary conditions, and develop a context-sensitive 
theory of ambidexterity at the IOR level.   
 
Theoretical background  
Ambidexterity in and across organizations 
Past ambidexterity studies have identified several ways of managing the tradeoff between exploration and 
exploitation (O’Reilly and Tushman 2013). Structural ambidexterity is a method for simultaneously 
pursuing exploration and exploitation by physically separating organizational subunits, for instance R&D 
units pursuing innovation and production units striving for efficiency (Adler and Heckscher 2013, Benner 
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and Tushman 2003). According to Puranam et al. (2006), two structural archetypes separately support inter-
organizational knowledge acquisition in different phases of technological development: one being structural 
separation with different units retaining their autonomy and exercising their own capabilities, which is 
particularly useful for exploration during technological development; the other being structural integration 
with different well-coordinated units exercising their integrated capabilities, which plays a central role in 
exploitation in the commercialization of developed technologies.  
An important challenge for senior management teams aiming for structural ambidexterity is handling 
contradictions between differentiated subunits while at the same time ensuring integration across them 
(Jansen et al. 2009, Smith and Tushman 2005). At the IOR level, subunits, or suppliers, are only loosely 
coupled, each having their own culture, incentives, and distinct managerial team, which makes it easier to 
achieve structural ambidexterity (Benner and Tushman 2003, Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). For example, 
Dyer et al. (1998) describe the close relationships Toyota and Nissan have with affiliated suppliers whom 
they encourage to pursue innovation, while with non-affiliated, standardized part suppliers they achieve cost 
efficiency. When encouraging the same suppliers to pursue exploration and exploitation simultaneously, 
however, buying firms need to be careful about the demands they impose on suppliers’ management teams: 
If the buying R&D units ask for innovative product development while their production units demand 
simultaneously cost efficiency, suppliers may find it difficult to manage resultant contradictions.    
Firms can oscillate between exploration and exploitation over time, temporally and sequentially 
alternating between organizational structures to bolster exploration or exploitation (Boumgarden et al. 2012, 
Nickerson and Zenger 2002). For example, Toyota strategically shrinks work-in-progress inventory to shift 
from routinized activities to exploratory learning both at operational and supply chain level (Adler et al. 
2009, Brunner et al. 2009). Such forms of sequential ambidexterity stimulate sudden or gradual shifts (Lavie 
and Rosenkopf 2006, Romanelli and Tushman 1994), and require proactive management interventions to 
manage transitions between exploration and exploitation (Lavie et al. 2010). In buyer-supplier relationships, 
however, buying firms are not able to directly manage transitions, and need to be careful of the challenges 
they impose on suppliers’ management teams. 
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Finally, defining an organizational context that combines discipline, stretch, trust and support 
appropriately can encourage “individuals to make their own judgments as to how to best divide their time 
between the conflicting demands for alignment and adaptability”, and help organizations to achieve 
ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004, p. 211). Adler et al. (1999) describe how Toyota management 
practices, such as assigning workers the responsibility to conduct kaizen (continuous improvement), 
encourage workers to not only follow standardized operating procedures, but also to improve them. 
Although contextual ambidexterity studies mainly focus on individual and group level behaviors in an 
organization (Lavie et al. 2010), some researchers discuss how contextual ambidexterity supports inter-firm 
knowledge and learning processes (e.g. Im and Rai 2008, Zimmermann et al. 2015). For example, 
Zimmermann et al. (2015) describe a bottom-up process through which an exploratory or exploitative 
alliance evolves into an ambidextrous one. Yet past research provides little insight into how firms can 
manage the ambidexterity of long-standing partners with both exploration and exploitation domains to 
achieve mutual short- and long-term benefits with them. 
The three modes described above use different mechanisms to manage the exploration-exploitation 
tradeoff, and each entails different management challenges. However, they are not in conflict, but rather are 
complementary (Andriopoulos and Lewis 2009, Raisch et al. 2009). For instance, Adler et al. (1999) 
describe how Toyota creates contextual ambidexterity internally through parallel organizational structures, 
with workers engaging in routinized activities in day-to-day operations, while switching to non-routinized 
kaizen activities in quality circles (i.e. structural ambidexterity). However, the distinctive mechanisms 
through which suppliers are encouraged to pursue both exploration and exploitation in long-term buyer-
supplier relationships remain opaque. Although as Adler et al. (1999) suggest, quality circles and job 
enrichment encourage employees within organizations to address the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in an 
active manner, the same mechanism is not applicable in buyer-supplier relationships as suppliers have their 
own management teams and make autonomous decisions. This underlines the importance of considering 
different organizational settings and different levels of analysis, and of taking a stronger context-sensitive 
approach to ambidexterity (Gupta et al. 2006, Lavie et al. 2010).  
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Exploration and exploitation in buyer-supplier relationships 
Buyer-supplier relationships are a form of IOR, or a quasi-integrated structure between markets and 
hierarchies (Im and Rai 2008). They resemble hierarchical structures with pronounced power asymmetries 
between partners as suppliers must meet the demands of buyers. At the same time, suppliers have their own 
decision making authority, and thus cannot be managed through hierarchical fiat. Instead, buying firms 
attempt to control suppliers through contractual relationships (Williamson 1979) that range from arm’s-
length to obligational (Sako, 1992). While the former seek to control supplier performance by contractually 
specifying their responsibilities, the latter maintain supplier autonomy while prompting voluntary efforts to 
improve performance through the establishment of trustful buyer-supplier relationships (Dyer and Chu 
2003; Sako and Helper 1998). 
Autonomy and control in buyer-supplier relationships are strongly connected to the management of the 
exploration-exploitation tradeoff. Exploration can be encouraged by an increase in actor autonomy, such as 
through job enrichment, and result in new routines (Adler et al. 1999), although inevitably autonomy 
sacrifices to some degree the coordinated or disciplined efforts among actors needed for achieving efficient 
use of resources (March 1991, Puranam et al. 2006). Exploitation in contrast is achieved through the efficient 
use of existing organizational resources through routinization (Adler et al. 1999, Lavie et al. 2010). The 
routinization of operational procedures increases the controllability of organizational behavior (Cohen et al. 
1996), but reduces opportunities for new experiences (March 1991). Thus, to achieve ambidexterity in long-
term relationships with suppliers, buying firms need to address the underlying tradeoff between autonomy 
and control.  
Even when buying firms are able to encourage suppliers to pursue both exploration and exploitation, 
they must reckon with the fact that suppliers have organizational routines and capabilities for achieving 
ambidexterity that differ from their own. Merely granting autonomy to a supplier does not necessarily lead 
to enhancing exploratory behavior at the operational level. Likewise, keeping tight control over a supplier 
may squeeze its profit margins and so imperils its trust in the relationship. If a buying firm wants a supplier 
 8 
to excel at both exploration and exploitation, it needs to mobilize its internal organizational functions, and 
put in place systems that guarantee the supplier can do so without negatively impacting its own profits. 
Toyota for example has organizational systems to support suppliers in exploratory activities such as 
developing new system components (Aoki and Lennerfors 2013a), and others to support exploitative 
activities which can lead to improving productivity, quality, and inventory turnover (e.g. Dyer and Nobeoka 
2000, Sako 2004). Since suppliers have limited resources, a strong emphasis on the part of the buying firm 
on exploration or exploitation is likely to result in the supplier focusing exclusively on one or the other. The 
mechanisms a buying firm can use to countervail that are the subject of our systematic analysis of 
ambidexterity in Toyota’s supplier relationships.  
 
Research Methods 
Given the explorative nature of our research, we relied on an inductive case study design (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007). We used a single case study (Yin 2003) and selected Toyota as a successful example. 
Empirical evidence points to Toyota’s ability to achieve both short and long term benefits from its supplier 
relationships. Its CCC21 program launched in 2000 to introduce more market-based elements into its 
purchasing policy did not aim to increase profitability by merely squeezing suppliers. Table 1 shows that 
the average profit ratios of Toyota and its major suppliers over the 2003-14 period was higher than that of 
its Japanese and Western rivals. These higher profit ratios reflect the short-term benefits achieved in supplier 
relationships, while long-term sales growth can be regarded as an indicator of long-term benefits.  
Table 1 about here 
 
Data collection 
Our data collection began in 2003 when the first results of the CCC21 program became known. It was clear 
with the first interviews in 2003 at Toyota’s Japanese headquarters that its purchasing was globalized and 
its supplier management highly interlinked with other functions such as JIT (just-in-time) production, design 
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sourcing, and shop-floor continuous improvement (gemba kaizen). Between 2003 and 2016 we conducted 
38 interviews with representatives of various Toyota divisions in and outside of Japan (see Table 2).  
Table 2 about here 
In the same period we collected data from among Toyota’s first-tier suppliers. Our focus on Toyota 
management practices vis-à-vis long-standing suppliers led us to select for interview suppliers meeting the 
following criteria: 1) having Toyota as the biggest customer; 2) having done business with Toyota for at 
least 30 years as a member of its supplier association; and 3) having both production and R&D internal 
subunits facing competitive pressures and uncertain environments. We conducted 136 interviews with 12 
suppliers in different locations as shown in Table 2. 
These semi-structured interviews were based on different sets of questions depending on the 
informant’s function.  For example, we asked Toyota informants in charge of supplier process improvement 
about joint problem-solving activities, participant motivation, and the performance measurements used. 
Each interview lasted between thirty minutes and two and a half hours, and all of them were tape-recorded 
and fully transcribed. We asked similar questions on the same topics in the interviews with Toyota and with 
a number of suppliers in different regions in order to validate the data and increase its trustworthiness 
(Lincoln and Guba 1985). 
During the same period we also conducted 13 plant tours at Toyota’s four assembly plants in Japan, 
Motomachi (6 times), Takaoka, Tsutsumi, and Kyushu, and four overseas plants, Bangalore in India, 
Burnaston in the UK, Tenjin in China, and Valenciennes in France. This allowed us to collect additional 
information on Toyota’s ambidextrous practices, such as gemba kaizen. We looked at supplier ambidextrous 
behavior by collecting information on their gemba kaizen with visits to 33 plants. Further data was collected 
from archival documents, including reports from Japanese research institutes such as FOURIN, Japanese 
newspapers such as “Nihon Keizai Shimbun”, and Toyota company documents (e.g. Annual Report for each 
year from 2003 to 2015, and the 75 Years of TOYOTA: http://www.toyota-
global.com/company/history_of_toyota/75years/). We triangulated data from various sources (i.e. 
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interviews, observations and archival documents) to address retrospective bias.    
 
Data analysis 
We analyzed the data in three steps while iterating between literature and the empirical data. First we 
identified two analytical units of Toyota supplier management: (1) mass-production (MP) where both 
buying firms and suppliers mainly conduct routinized activities for exploitative purposes; (2) product 
development (PD) where non-routinized exploratory activities play a central role both for buying firms and 
suppliers. We extracted systems, practices and events related to Toyota’s PD separately from its MP to get 
a more complete picture of both activities, and did the same for its suppliers. 
Second, within each of the two analytical units we attempted to identify how Toyota enabled suppliers 
to manage the exploration-exploitation tradeoff using the following coding process: We first classified the 
data into two broad categories, buying firm supplier management practices that address the control-
autonomy tradeoff, and buying firm organizational systems that help suppliers achieve ambidexterity. 
Within each of the two categories we conducted first-order coding using interviewees’ own terms as in vivo 
codes, which were subsequently linked to abstract themes using theoretical terms. We identified theoretical 
themes from the ambidexterity and the supplier relations literatures, while remaining open to any emerging 
phenomenon. In the course of our analysis, a new category, ‘requisite security’, emerged, which covered 
both the MP and the PD phase. These coding results are shown in Table 3-1 and 3-2 with representative 
quotes, while key themes used in the main text are highlighted in italics. 
One of the difficulties we encountered in this process was the interpretation and translation of our 
interview data. Most interviews with Japanese informants were conducted in Japanese. The Japanese often 
use ambiguous words on the assumption that the parties in the conversation share a certain amount of tacit 
knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). In quotes used in this paper we complement often unspoken, 
implicit information by adding comments in brackets. Initial interpretations and translations were done by 
the first author who is a native Japanese speaker and subsequently verified by the second author who was 
raised in Europe, but has extensive experience with the Japanese language and culture through living and 
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working in Japan. Differences in interpretation were settled by sending e-mails to the original interviewees, 
or by additional interviews. A native speaker of English checked the accuracy of English translations. 
Third, we searched for patterns across the two analytical units to create generalizable observations on 
ambidexterity at the buyer-supplier relationship level, by taking into consideration the different settings and 
boundary conditions between the two polar phases. We compared the results of the two analytical units 
based on our two dimensions, supplier management practices and organizational systems, as well as 
‘requisite security’ as a newly emerged category. We identified theoretical relationships between the 
emerging constructs, and generated several observations. We confirmed our final interpretations with three 
extensive interviews with a well-experienced Toyota informant. 
Table 3-1, 3-2 about here 
 
Findings 
Managing ambidexterity in the mass-production (MP) phase 
Supplier management practices. In the MP phase both Toyota and its suppliers mainly conduct 
routinized activities related to automobile production. Toyota issues kanban to suppliers several times per 
shift to keep them updated on quantities needed and delivery timing. The suppliers use the information to 
produce parts and deliver them in a JIT manner. A critical issue in supplier management in this phase is 
keeping routinized production activities at a steady state. Towards that end, Toyota formulates explicit goals, 
such as ppm (defective parts per million), and on-time delivery rates. Toyota monitors goal achievement 
and regularly provides performance feedback. If suppliers only stuck to their routinized activities, however, 
it would be difficult to motivate them to improve their existing routines. Therefore, Toyota prescribes gentei 
(cost reduction) targets, that usually range from 1 to 1.5%, to all major suppliers either annually or semi-
annually to get them to break out of existing routines and create new ones. A corporate planning manager 
of Supplier 10 explained gentei as follows: 
“Toyota gives us cost reduction targets in the form of x% from the current price. We are engaged in achieving 
this target through our own kaizen activities. Once the price is revised, we are given a lower price target in the 
 12 
next round. Then we need to work on further lowering prices. It is very tough to address gentei.” 
 
Suppliers need to meet gentei requests without lowering the exacting requirements of quality or deliver 
accuracy. An executive director of Supplier 3 noted: 
 “The JIT system pushes ourselves to do even more… Even a minor problem can give customers a hard time. We 
cannot risk worsening our quality and productivity. Under this ever-increasing pressure, we can’t live without 
continuously solving problems every day. We always need to do kaizen” 
 
Toyota’s explicit goals are the stimulus for continuously conducting kaizen activities to meet cost 
reduction targets. At the same time, these goals, and gentei requests in particular, bear the risks of directing 
suppliers’ efforts to the attainment of cost reduction targets, through which their kaizen activities can easily 
become mere exploitative, short-term profit-seeking activities. To counter that Toyota provides several 
programs on how to implement kaizen activities, including supplier learning groups for TPS (Toyota 
Production System), QC (Quality Control) initiatives for problem solving activities, and other educational 
programs. The programs are never attempts to force suppliers to merely follow instructions, but leave 
ambiguity and leave it to suppliers to decide which elements and practices to implement. This way Toyota 
creates opportunities for suppliers to identify their own action points and develop their own capabilities 
from a long-term viewpoint. 
Toyota India, for example, established a Supplier Support Center where topics such as safety, quality, 
and TPS are covered in a one-year extensive education program. After each module trainees return to their 
own plants to implement what they have learned. Toyota allows suppliers considerable latitude on 
implementation, encouraging them to identify their particular problems and their root causes and to improve 
their routines as needed. Indeed, the head of the center stressed the importance of suppliers “identifying 
their own problems by themselves” and “implementing what they want”. Further opportunities for raising 
awareness of performance differentials within Toyota suppliers are created through workshops for 
executives from supplier firms. The head of the center went on to say:   
“We invite top executives from other suppliers to the workshop conducted in the plant of one of our best suppliers. 
This way, they can understand that their plant performs at a lower level. Then, they have a talk with Toyota 
colleagues and come to understand which areas need to be improved.” 
 
Mutual learning opportunities are also created through learning groups (jishuken) that are usually made 
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up of 7 or 8 suppliers. Participants visit in rotation each other’s plant taking part in two to three month kaizen 
projects under the tutelage of a Toyota TPS expert. The following quote from a corporate planning director 
of Supplier 1 shows suppliers use these opportunities for exploratory learning, not only to learn how to 
implement kaizen:   
“The greatest incentive for us to join jishuken is to develop our human resources. If they [the employees] would 
only stay inside this company, their horizon would inevitably narrow. Jishuken is a good opportunity for them to 
learn from other supplier companies. We can never be content with our current situation.” 
 
Toyota’s QC program also fosters exploratory learning. A Toyota QC expert stressed the importance 
of teaching “a way of thinking”, and of encouraging suppliers to “ask themselves why the problem has 
happened”, instead of giving detailed instructions on how to solve problems. This way, suppliers can 
develop their own ideas on how their production processes could be improved. The same informant 
explained: “We cannot evolve ourselves by simply getting know-how from someone else… But we can do 
a big kaizen, or innovation, when we have ‘know-why’ [knowing the reasons behind the problem]”. The 
example of the British plant of Supplier 6’ that participated in Toyota’s QC initiative shows how the 
exploration-oriented perspective was retained in the implementation of kaizen activities. The plant not only 
learnt how to conduct problem solving activities through this initiative (e.g. by observing other plants’ 
excellent practices), but also set up its own kaizen team with three engineers as core members. While the 
team was in charge of actual kaizen implementation in this plant, its main purpose was, however, not just 
geared towards cost reductions or productivity improvements. The team was charged with kaizen 
implementation at the plant, but its primary purpose went beyond cost reductions and productivity 
improvements as the head of the plant explained: “We encourage shop-floor supervisors and team leaders 
to conduct kaizen with the kaizen team, such as doing time studies. Ultimately, this activity aims at 
developing their ability to identify problems by themselves”.  
Organizational systems. Although the purchasing division is the primary point of contact for suppliers, 
most of the activities that help suppliers improve their routines or achieve kaizen results at the operational 
level are conducted by other divisions, such as production, production technology and quality. While tight 
coordination among different divisions in Toyota’s internal organization allows for quick responses to 
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supplier problems, interaction with suppliers is structurally separated. For example, while gentei targets are 
the responsibility of purchasing, it is that of the quality division to assure the quality of purchased parts. A 
quality division informant explained:      
“I believe a supplier who lowers prices by 1% every year and who is just strictly following Toyota’s requests will 
sooner or later cause problems, unless the cost structure of that company is fundamentally revised. Otherwise 
chances are high that the company just omitted a step in the inspection process, or simplified the production 
process.” 
 
This quote highlights that prescribing gentei targets alone is not always conducive to suppliers’ ‘real’ 
efforts for improving their existing routines at the operational level. Thus, Toyota’s quality division 
demands that suppliers create new problem-solving routines such as inventing new tools or pokayoke (error 
proofing devices) that ensure sufficient quality before a step in the inspection process can be omitted. In 
fact, it is the quality division with its different expertise and role, and not purchasing, that evaluates and 
approves changes in supplier processes. This structurally separated approach plays a critical role in helping 
suppliers achieve kaizen results without excessively focusing on short-term results, and to so manage 
exploration and exploitation. With the exception of Value Engineering and other activities related to PD, 
Toyota’s various supplier support programs do not directly aim to reduce costs to meet gentei targets, but 
try to develop supplier long-term manufacturing capabilities. For example, Supplier 12 received help that 
resulted in drastically improving its production process in conjunction with Toyota’s production technology 
engineers. The president of Supplier 12 explained: 
“This project is not organized by the purchasing division for lowering the part price. It is not linked to regular 
cost reduction targets. Nonetheless, we aim to improve our cost competitiveness. This project has a bigger goal 
than merely meeting gentei targets in the short term. We carry out this monozukuri [manufacturing] revolution 
project for the purpose of enhancing the competitiveness of our company as a whole.” 
   
Suppliers can also improve their existing routines by participating in Toyota’s jishuken and QC 
initiatives, which are structurally separated from gentei in order to foster exploration. This is illustrated by 
Supplier 4’s QC circle initiative at its British plant that started as part of Toyota’s QC initiative. After 
learning how to organize a QC circle, including steps and methods for problem solving, the plant started its 
own activities. The first author participated in an internal QC workshop at Supplier 4 and observed similar 
QC steps as ones used at Toyota: after the problem was systematically defined, root causes were identified. 
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Subsequent problem-solving activities led to the invention of a pokayoke that could eliminate eight minutes 
of redundant time (field notes on Supplier 4). These activities, including brainstorming and process-flow 
analysis, were carried out by Supplier 4’s shop-floor operators and a team leader. Before the initiative, only 
engineers were engaged in such analytical problem-solving processes. Engineers now carry out a more 
supportive role helping shop-floor workers in solving problems. This led to better communication channels 
and to an improved understanding by engineers of shop-floor problems, and ultimately to new problem-
solving routines based on stronger collaboration between the two groups.  
 
Managing ambidexterity in the product development (PD) phase 
Supplier management practices. The PD phase is characterized by greater uncertainty and the need 
for quick responses to unexpected problems. Suppliers must therefore have a high degree of autonomy so 
that they can develop adequate technical solutions for problems. Most of the suppliers we interviewed 
developed parts for Toyota based on their own design drawings for parts development (shonin-zu), but 
Toyota’s design drawings (Toyota-zu) was used as well for certain categories of parts. A corporate planning 
manager of Supplier 10 highlighted the value of that: “Sending our engineers to Toyota allows us to bring 
in our ideas into the design drawings on how this part could be produced at a lower cost”. As part of this 
guest engineer system design engineers from suppliers stay at a Toyota development center for up to three 
years, and work as engineers on Toyota’s payroll. 
In both the case of shonin-zu and Toyota-zu, suppliers that develop parts for Toyota are, in principle, 
selected through a competition process (Toyota Motor Corporation 2012). In the selection process suppliers 
must follow explicit criteria set by Toyota, such as cost and specifications. However, if Toyota, or any 
buying firm, were to select a supplier based only on explicitly set criteria, there is a risk that suppliers would 
narrowly focus on attaining the criteria at the cost of developing better products. In order to avoid that and 
to encourage autonomous efforts for continuous improvement (or kaizen), Toyota leaves some ambiguity in 
setting supplier-selection criteria. This is evidenced by the following excerpt from the basic purchasing 
policies (Toyota Motor Corporation, 2012, p. 4):  
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“We evaluate the overall strengths of prospective suppliers, including their quality, technological capabilities, 
and reliability in delivering the required quantities on time. (--line break--) Also, we evaluate their potential 
strengths, as evidenced in such ways as their amenability to continuing, kaizen improvements.” 
 
A Toyota’s purchasing director further explained: “We take into account not only QCD [quality cost 
delivery] performance, but also top management attitude and company structure when we select our 
suppliers”. By using unmeasurable, ambiguous criteria such as “management attitude”, Toyota considers 
suppliers’ autonomous efforts that cannot clearly be measured in the selection process. The following quote 
from a corporate planning director of Supplier 1 suggests that this ambiguity encourages suppliers to go the 
extra mile:  
“[An American maker] gives us 20 sheets of design drawings and asks us to develop a part just following the 
drawings. But Toyota gives us only 3 sheets. This is shoninzu. Our company creates a dozen detailed drawings 
that will be approved by Toyota. However, it is impossible to write down all of the knowhow needed in the 
drawings. We provide the best products to Toyota beyond what is written down in the drawings and contract 
terms. I think our tacit efforts might be greater than those explicitly described in the drawings.”  
 
As a result of this ambiguous goal setting, instead of just meeting performance targets, suppliers 
continuously pursue the development of better products for Toyota. For example, a supplier of car seats for 
the Lexus line described how new design ideas were tried to completely get rid of wrinkles in the seat cover 
even though they recognized that attempt was physically impossible:  
“We understand Toyota’s idea of omoiire-hinshitsu [emotional quality]… We respond to quality requests even if 
they cannot be explained by words. For example, it is impossible to get rid of wrinkles from car seats. But we 
make an effort to make wrinkles less noticeable as much as possible”. 
 
In order to coordinate autonomous, exploratory efforts, Toyota tries to influence supplier activities by 
visualizing each step of the PD process and specifying what suppliers need to do (i.e. control by explicitness 
in the implementation process). This is codified in the ‘Toyota Standard’ which includes information such 
as which evaluation test is needed at a specific point in time, what judgement criterion needs to be used for 
specific test equipment, and which material requirement needs to be met for each part. A Toyota’s PD 
informant noted: “We set a rigid schedule at the design phase. A timetable showing what we do at which 
point in time is decided at an initial stage, and given to suppliers. We keep tight control over each process 
step at the design phase”. By making the implementation process transparent, suppliers are encouraged to 
synchronize their own PD process with Toyota’s process for ensuring better coordination. For example, 
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similar to Toyota’s PD process, Supplier 9 made its design engineers responsible for the production process 
as well, and interact with production engineers from an early stage of PD: 
“Our design engineers do not finish their work after completing design drawings and mold tools. They actually 
go into production plants. They create design drawings by going to the gemba [plant floor], making a confirmation 
[on the manufacturability of their designed parts], and reflecting gemba information to the design drawings.” 
(President, Supplier 9’s European office) 
 
In order to ensure a similar coordination process in its European office, Supplier 3 has a system in place 
for sending newly hired design engineers to the production floor where they work as shop-floor workers for 
one month. 
Organizational systems. In the PD phase, Toyota’s organizational systems that help suppliers achieve 
ambidextrous results at the operational level, e.g. developing better products at lower cost, are integrated 
rather than separated. For example, Toyota has a design review system, Design Review Based on Failure 
Mode (DRBFM), where members from supplier firms as well as different divisions at Toyota, such as 
production technology and production, jointly discuss and confirm with Toyota design engineers changes 
that have been made in design drawings. Toyota engineering, purchasing and production teams come 
together with supplier representatives in Toyota’s obeya (big room) to jointly solve problems during the 
development process of new vehicles. Furthermore, Toyota receives guest engineers from suppliers in 
almost all main areas of auto-parts development, who jointly work with Toyota and conduct problem solving 
in the development process.  
Such integrated organizational systems allow Toyota and its suppliers to share information and 
knowledge at a deep level and to help coordinate the PD process between Toyota and its suppliers. The 
guest engineer system we have described provides opportunities for engineers from suppliers to share their 
PD experience with Toyota’s engineers, and allows them to better understand Toyota’s PD process. A PD 
informant of Toyota explained: 
“We undertake a role of leading guest engineers… Guest engineers who come to Toyota for the first time always 
attend a meeting with a Toyota sempai [a senior colleague who takes the role of a mentor]. By interaction with 
their sempai they get to know how Toyota engages in [the PD] and the underlying thinking process.”  
 
The same informant also explained that Toyota, in turn, was able to better understand “how Toyota can 
change testing conditions for suppliers so that they can develop better parts” and “what support Toyota 
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should give suppliers at what time”. What is learned is regularly updated in the Toyota Standard. 
Toyota provides suppliers with information that directly serves in developing innovative products. This 
is evidenced by the following quote from an anonymous supplier: 
“Our component [related to powertrains] has changed from mechanical to electronic control [that uses a 
drastically different computerized system than before]… But we were facing a matching problem between the 
mechanical and the computer systems [in the development process]. We could solve this problem because Toyota 
gave us the needed information for achieving the matching.” 
 
The supplier told us his firm was allowed by Toyota to also sell the newly invented product – growing 
out of information on key components provided by Toyota – to other carmakers. The information shared by 
Toyota made it possible for the supplier to cope with a major technical shift from mechanical to electronic 
control and to get ahead of competitors. That supplier has become the global market leader for that product.  
Our findings show that suppliers that have developed a synchronized PD system with Toyota enjoy 
better coordination among different functional divisions within their company, which leads to the 
achievement of significant results. In the following quote from a 2004 interview Supplier 3 describes how 
it mastered the difficult challenge of a CCC21 cost reduction of 30% by integrating its existing internal 
resources for seeking innovative solutions:  
“We cannot achieve 30% cost reduction only by developing new manufacturing methods. In purchasing, we need 
to look for some cheaper plastics. If such cheaper material is not able to ensure a certain degree of strength, we 
should change the product design to get a thicker product... We have achieved this target for some products, and 




Although our findings show how Toyota’s supplier management practices and organizational systems can 
lead to ambidexterity on the part of suppliers, our analysis still leaves some questions unanswered. How are 
supplier management teams motivated to pursue both exploration and exploitation at the MP phase under 
Toyota’s structurally separated support systems? How do suppliers retain their exploratory perspective 
while competing for contracts and dealing with exacting requirements at the PD phase? We identified an 
emerging category of requisite security that can be used to reassure suppliers that their efforts to meet the 
difficult challenges posed by Toyota will be rewarded.  
In the MP phase, Toyota encourages suppliers to address simultaneously achieving cost reduction, high 
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quality and delivery accuracy by giving them explicit targets, gentei in particular. Gentei differs from the 
Western carmaker practice of contractually setting price cuts (e.g. 3% for the first year, 2.5% for the second 
year, and so on). Not meeting a benchmark puts the supplier in breach of contract and at risk of contract 
termination. Toyota does not specify the exact amount of gentei a priori, but rather through negotiations that 
are ongoing with suppliers, which allows for taking each supplier’s current individual situation into account. 
The president of Supplier 12 explains:  
“We receive gentei requests once every six months… When we negotiate prices [with Toyota] our financial and 
competitive situation is taken into account. Gentei prices are decided in each case depending on the situation... If 
we have to describe how Toyota’s gentei differs from other [Japanese] makers’, I’d say that Toyota’s requests 
are more logical.”  
 
Thus, gentei are targets, not absolutes imposed on suppliers, which would create overly excessive 
pressures to reduce costs. The suppliers we interviewed believed that Toyota would not terminate a contract 
for insufficient progress based on gentei, which makes them feel safe. The executive director of Supplier 1 
expressed this in saying: “We are under pressure of cost reduction, but we feel secure knowing that our 
business will not be terminated. That’s why we can make efforts [for Toyota]”. Toyota, in fact, allows 
suppliers to reject gentei for one part for which reducing the cost would be especially difficult in exchange 
for substantial cost reductions for other parts. Requisite security is not, however, an escape valve for 
relieving pressure. Toyota negotiates gentei targets with its suppliers based on a careful analysis of the cost 
structure of their parts, and grants exceptions only when deemed reasonable.  
Requisite security also means that Toyota guarantees the continuity of a relationship with a supplier as 
long as there are continuous efforts towards meeting exacting requirements. For example, we described how 
at the PD phase suppliers were encouraged to develop innovative ideas for better products, while reducing 
costs through better coordination between functional subunits and with Toyota. Competition for contracts 
can be fierce and a supplier may not be awarded one despite having made substantial efforts. Non-selection 
represents a loss of time and energy; suppliers may hedge their bets by focusing on safe exploitative-oriented 
projects instead of risky explorative ones. As a check on such calculations, Toyota grants unsuccessful 
suppliers an improved chance on the next project. An executive director at Supplier 1’s US office 
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commented: 
“In the case of US [carmakers], if we lose this time, we need to start from zero. They just say “good luck in the 
next model”. They don’t expect a long-term relationship with us. By contrast, we can expect a long-term 
relationship with our customers in Japan. Even if we lose [out on doing business with Toyota] this time, our 
efforts will be positively taken into account next time.” 
 
According to a Supplier 2 plant director, Toyota helps unsuccessful suppliers to go on to develop better, 
cost competitive parts for upcoming models. By offering such requisite security, Toyota encourages its 
suppliers to make the long-term, even risky, investments needed for developing innovative products. A 
corporate planning director of an anonymous supplier looked back on the beginning of a part development 
project for Toyota’s hybrid cars: 
“We all responded to Toyota’s call. We never thought hybrid cars would become as popular as they are today. 
We responded to it even though we expected to lose money… we developed it with huge investments and initial 




Our analysis led to the development of the theoretical model shown in Figure 1 which depicts how Toyota’s 
supplier management practices and organizational systems aim to prevent suppliers from overemphasizing 
either exploration or exploitation at both the management and the operational level. The model also shows 
that these countervailing mechanisms function differently at the MP than at the PD phase, while requisite 
security helps suppliers cope with Toyota’s demands across the two phases. This enables suppliers to excel 
at both exploration and exploitation, and hence to achieve superior short-term (profitability) and long-term 
(sales growth) performance for buying firms and suppliers themselves (see Table 1). 
Figure 1 about here 
Toyota manages the autonomy-control tradeoff by using explicitness and ambiguity differently in the 
two value-creating phases. At the MP phase, characterized by inherently routinized activities, Toyota gives 
suppliers explicit quality, cost, and delivery goals to meet. By regularly raising the bar, (i.e., gentei), Toyota 
encourages suppliers to depart from existing routinized activities. At the same time, in order to avoid an 
excessive focus on exploitative, cost-reduction efforts, Toyota purposefully uses ambiguity in its 
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implementation process and gives suppliers the autonomy they need to create new routines. At the PD phase, 
which involves non-routinized activities, an overreliance on explicit goals would hurt exploration and limit 
the search for new ideas, or the drive to experiment with novel methods. Toyota leaves considerable 
ambiguity in the formulation of its goals so that suppliers are given the autonomy needed to more fully 
utilize their potential. At the same time, Toyota coordinates suppliers’ autonomous efforts by clearly 
specifying the implementation process in its Toyota Standard, which serves as a countervailing mechanism 
against too much exploration.  
Ambiguity is sometimes seen as an inhibitor of collective action and a source of ongoing tension over 
strategic direction (Sillince et al. 2012), making organizational integration difficult (Vaara 2003). At the 
same time, some researchers recognize that ambiguity can be used for achieving particular strategic 
purposes, such as gaining stakeholder acceptance of strategic decisions by creating room for multiple 
interpretations (Denis et al. 2011) or stimulating creativity (Lingo and O’Mahony 2010). These 
contradictory views on ambiguity grow out of its dual role in sensemaking: on the one hand, ambiguity 
triggers sensemaking, and leads to the exploration of new meanings by allowing for multiple interpretations, 
on the other hand, it makes meanings equivocal, which can lead to confusion among organizational members 
making coordination difficult (Maitlis and Christianson 2014, Weick 1995). In the case of Toyota, 
ambiguity is used deliberately in the implementation process to alleviate the shortcomings of explicit goals 
used at the MP phase. This leads to the following observation: 
OBSERVATION 1a. Buying firms can use explicitness in goal formulation for stimulating suppliers to 
improve their existing activities at a phase where the core activities are routinized, such as mass production, 
while the exploitative focus fostered by explicitness can be countervailed through the deliberate use of 
ambiguity in the implementation process. 
 
On the other hand, ambiguity is used in the goal formulation process at the PD phase to encourage 
exploration. In order to alleviate the shortcomings of ambiguity (e.g. coordination difficulties), however, 
Toyota is deliberately using explicitness in the implementation process, thereby ensuring well-coordinated 
efforts. Accordingly: 
OBSERVATION 1b. Buying firms can use ambiguity in goal formation for encouraging suppliers’ 
autonomous, exploratory efforts at a phase where the core activities are non-routinized, such as product 
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development, while the shortcomings of ambiguity can be countervailed through the deliberate use of 
explicitness in the implementation process.  
 
Toyota uses the structurally separated or integrated approach differently across phases to help suppliers 
achieve ambidexterity. At the MP phase, Toyota’s purchasing function sets demanding cost reduction 
(gentei) targets to encourage supplier exploitative efforts. By structurally separating its supplier support 
activities from its cost reduction procedures, Toyota fosters a long-term, exploratory perspective on these 
activities and encourages suppliers to develop new routines on their own. At the PD phase, in contrast, 
Toyota uses a structurally integrated approach for ensuring that the efforts of its various divisions which 
help suppliers develop parts for Toyota are well-coordinated. This leads to enhanced information and 
knowledge sharing between Toyota and its suppliers, which in turn helps suppliers integrate their internal 
resources, align their activities with those of Toyota, and effectively manage their PD process. 
Puranam et al. (2006) have argued that a structurally integrated approach is effective in gaining 
knowledge from acquisitions and conducting exploitative activities with acquisition partners, while Kang et 
al. (2007) and O’Reilly and Tushman (2013) have made the same arguments for exploitation within single 
organizations. However, we argue that structural forms function differently at the buyer-supplier 
relationship level where buying firms lack hierarchical fiat over suppliers. At the MP phase, integrating 
buying firms’ support into cost reduction processes might push suppliers into the success trap (Levinthal 
and March 1993). In such a situation, suppliers could achieve short-term benefits from kaizen activities, but 
lose their long-term dynamic capabilities (O’Reilly and Tushman 2008, Teece et al. 1997). This in turn 
would create further need for support from buying firms. By structurally separating support from an 
exploitative purpose, buying firms can help suppliers develop their own long-term exploratory capabilities 
while avoiding a vicious cycle of ever-increasing demands for support by their expanding supplier base. 
This leads to the following observation: 
OBSERVATION 2a. At the buyer-supplier relationship level where suppliers have separate 
management teams and organizational routines, buying firms can better help suppliers handle exploration-
exploitation tradeoffs by using a structurally separated approach at a phase where the core activities are 
routinized. 
    
At the PD phase a structurally integrated approach within single organizations could ensure improved 
 23 
coordination among subunits but sacrifice to some degree their autonomous, exploratory efforts. At the 
buyer-supplier relationship level, however, suppliers are not always allowed to develop their own products 
without constraints imposed by the architecture of the buying firm’s final product. This is particularly true 
in the case of products with a more integrated product architecture like automobiles (Jacobides et al. 2016). 
In such a situation, it is less important to maintain “pragmatic boundaries” (Carlile 2004, Raisch et al. 2009) 
to protect exploratory activities from the organization’s exploitative tendencies. A structurally integrated 
approach thus, allows suppliers to better use information and knowledge gained from buying firms for 
developing parts that are well-adapted to the architecture of the final product. This leads to the following 
observation: 
OBSERVATION 2b. At the buyer-supplier relationship level where the architecture of suppliers’ 
products is integrated into buying firms’ products, buying firms can better help suppliers handle 
exploration-exploitation tradeoffs through the use of a structurally integrated approach at a phase where 
the core activities are non-routinized.   
    
Finally, requisite security offers suppliers the necessary security to deal with the challenging demands 
of buying firms at the MP and PD phases. By ensuring requisite security for suppliers at the MP phase, e.g. 
through making gentei targets negotiable, Toyota protects suppliers from excessive cost reduction pressures, 
and, hence discourages them from taking defensive actions to protect their profit margins. Toyota also 
ensures requisite security for suppliers, e.g. by increasing opportunities for future business in order to 
provide them with sufficient incentives to undertake risky, explorative projects at the PD phase. Past studies 
have highlighted how Toyota uses stimulation mechanisms, such as JIT (Eisenhardt and Westcott 1988), 
and perturbation (Adler et al. 2009, Brunner et al. 2009), to deliberately create paradoxical tensions that 
encourage suppliers to achieve ambidextrous results. However, little attention has been paid to how Toyota 
reduces the excessive pressures that can result from these tensions.  
Past studies on organizational paradoxes have highlighted that paradoxical tensions often provoke 
anxiety and defensive actions that result in vicious cycles (Schad et al. 2016, Smith and Lewis 2011). We 
found in our study that Toyota’s JIT and gentei demands create high paradoxical tensions. Requisite security 
can reassure suppliers that their efforts will be rewarded, and encourage proactive actions such as continuous 
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improvement in production and product development activities. As Weick (1995) suggests, the expectation 
of favorable outcomes is needed for actors to address difficult challenges. Our study suggests that buying 
firms, or any organization that tries to make use of stimulation mechanisms through which paradoxical 
tensions are created need to be careful about motivating as well as possible demotivating effects. This leads 
to the final observation: 
OBSERVATION 3. Buying firms can successfully motivate supplier management teams to address 
deliberately created paradoxical tensions by offering requisite security that their efforts to address difficult 
challenges will eventually be rewarded.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Theoretical implications  
Our study illustrates how a focal organization (i.e. buying firm) can encourage ambidexterity in its partner 
organizations (i.e. suppliers). Whereas past research on ambidexterity management in IOR has mainly 
focused on how firms can achieve balance between exploratory and exploitative alliances, we have explored 
in this paper a novel aspect, i.e., how an organization can manage the ambidexterity of a partner organization 
in order to achieve ambidextrous results, that is, both short-term and long-term benefits. Our model 
introduced the new concepts of deliberate use of ambiguity and explicitness and of requisite security to the 
field of ambidexterity studies. 
Our model also uses existing concepts, such as structural separation and structural integration, but 
specifies their boundary conditions at the level of the buyer-supplier relationship. Buying firms must cope 
with their product performance depending on the PD and MP capabilities of suppliers they cannot manage 
through hierarchical coordination. When an organization attempts to achieve ambidexterity with a partner 
organization in such a relationship, the way structural separation and integration work differs from that 
described in the extant literature (Kauppila 2010; Puranam et al. 2006, Raisch et al. 2009). The structurally 
integrated approach is more suitable for coordinating exploratory activities between buying firms and 
suppliers at the PD phase, while an exploitative perspective at the MP phase should be structurally separated 
from buying firm support activities. Thus our model responds to calls for a stronger context-sensitive 
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approach to ambidexterity “to avoid unwarranted generalization” (Lavie et al. 2010, p. 141).  
We also provide critical insights with novel research that links previous work on supplier relationships 
with the ambidexterity field. Past studies have highlighted that buying firms can achieve both short- and 
long-term benefits through separately managing suppliers that have specialized domains; i.e.,  encouraging 
exploration by specialized parts suppliers with excellent R&D capability as opposed to exploitation by 
standardized parts suppliers  (Asanuma 1989, Dyer et al. 1998, Williamson 1991). Such a system fits well 
with the idea of structural ambidexterity (Benner and Tushman 2003, O’Reilly and Tushman 2013), but 
while effective for buying firms with a diversified supplier portfolio, it is less suitable for achieving 
ambidexterity in a relationship with a single supplier who has both specialized and standardized domains. 
Our study highlights the importance of countervailing mechanisms (Observation 1a, 1b and 2a, 2b) through 
which buying firms might be able to keep suppliers from excessively focusing on either exploitation or 
exploration, while at the same time encourage them to achieve both short-term and long-term mutual 
benefits. By presenting such mechanisms, our study brings supplier relationship management a step closer 
to a true buyer-supplier win-win. 
As for the generalizability of our model, the organizational system that supports supplier’ ambidexterity 
at the MP phase (Observation 2a) is broadly applicable to the management of suppliers with production 
activities. A purely short-term, exploitative focus would be particularly problematic for exploitation-
oriented suppliers, given shorter product life cycles and faster technological change (Schreyögg and Sydow 
2010). Thus, an exploratory, long-term perspective is critical even for exploitation-oriented suppliers in 
order to keep up with environmental changes by continuously conducting process innovation (Abernathy 
1978, Benner and Tushman 2003). A structurally separated approach that decouples exploitation from 
support activities has thus a positive effect on the ambidexterity of suppliers. However, our model in the PD 
phase is more restricted in its generalizability potential. Although the system described in Observation 2b 
can be applicable to any supplier whose components are integrated into the architecture of the final product 
(Jacobides et al. 2016), the same mechanism would have negative effects when developing radical 
innovations with new suppliers. To fully tap into the expertise of such new suppliers, buying firms need to 
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grant them a sufficient degree of autonomy by using structurally separated organizational systems (Benner 
and Tushman 2015). Thus, our model of ambidexterity fits better with incremental innovation (Abernathy 
1978). 
Finally, our study highlights the role of requisite security in encouraging suppliers to address 
paradoxical tensions and to avoid defensive actions that fuel vicious cycles (Smith and Lewis 2011). Past 
studies have stressed the importance of ‘paradoxical thinking’ that guides actors to accommodate 
paradoxical tensions, and take proactive actions that trigger organizational innovation and superior 
performance (Eisenhardt and Westcott 1988, Schad et al. 2016). While previous authors have described how 
Toyota’s culture makes employees more prone to accept contradictions (Osono et al. 2008) and willing to 
see problems as opportunities (Adler et al. 2009), our concept of requisite security shows how Toyota 
stimulates paradoxical thinking by suppliers while buffering them against excessive tensions. Requisite 
security thus can be regarded as an enabler of paradoxical thinking that improves ambidexterity in IOR, and 
connects the paradoxical perspective to ambidexterity studies in a novel way.  
 
Practical implications 
Beyond its theoretical contributions, our study has critical implications for practitioners, particularly those 
trying to learn ‘best practices’ (Benner and Tushman 2015) from Toyota. Past studies on Toyota have argued 
for the concept of ‘explicitness’ as a driver of continuous improvement (kaizen), achieved through visual 
control (Liker 2004), documented procedures (Hino 2006), and a conversion from tacit to explicit 
knowledge (Osono et al. 2008). Little attention has been paid to the role of ambiguity. If managers depend 
only on explicitness during both the goal formulation and implementation process, little room remains for 
employees and suppliers to exercise autonomy. As our study shows, actors can develop their own problem-
solving routines by identifying problems and themselves pursuing underlying reasons. Managers and 
practitioners thus need to use both explicitness and ambiguity when they promote kaizen initiatives on the 
shop-floor, either at the organizational or inter-organizational level.  
Our study also cautions managers who heavily rely on stimulation mechanisms. Exerting undue 
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pressure to achieve the cheapest price or zero inventory, elicits defensive responses that fuel vicious cycles 
(Smith and Lewis 2011). Requisite security is needed to encourage actors to address paradoxical tensions, 
and for stimulation mechanisms to be sustainable. Stimulation mechanisms without requisite security can 
undermine trustful relationships. This is particularly true for Western companies that actively push suppliers 
to lower costs, but have hard-nosed, transaction-based relationships with them, or collaboration without 
trust as MacDuffie and Helper (2006) put it. Our study shows how Toyota carefully manages its long-term 
relationships with suppliers, imposing on them exacting requirements such as gentei on the one hand, while 
allowing suppliers some leeway in setting gentei targets on the other, thereby avoiding excessive pressure 
on suppliers that could damage confidence in Toyota.   
Moreover, methods for using requisite security depend on the relational context in both cultural and 
historical terms, and managers must be aware of that. In Japan, Toyota and its suppliers have formed close 
relationships over long periods of time, and supplier expectations of future rewards do not depend on 
contracts. The keiretsu relationship is regarded as a legitimized institutional system in Japan (Ahmadjian, 
2016), something not easily understood in some countries. This may be behind Toyota’s recall problems in 
the US in 2009, which can serve as a cautionary tale for managers. Unlike in the US where there is heavy 
reliance on contractual relationships, in Japan detailed contracts play little part in supplier management. 
Toyota had a short history with the throttle-pedal supplier now recognized as the source of one of the recall 
problems (Liker, 2010). It is possible that Toyota implicitly expected that supplier to make autonomous 
efforts to ensure reliable quality without sufficiently clarifying its requirements, whereas the supplier, used 
to receiving explicit instructions, did no more than what was clearly instructed.   
Similar misunderstandings could occur, even in Japan, with independent suppliers whose main 
customer is not Toyota, and who may not have a strong commitment to Toyota practices. This might be the 
case with the airbag supplier Takata who caused another big recall problem. Ever-increasing technological 
complexity of automobiles (MacDuffie and Fujimoto, 2010), makes it less and less feasible to monitor all 
of the technical details of components and to specify every detail in a contract (Williamson, 1979).  
Carmakers, whether in Japan or in the US, need to depend on supplier goodwill trust (Sako, 1992) to some 
 28 
degree. Toyota’s recall problems point to the importance of adequate, relationship-specific supporting 
systems in reducing misunderstandings that might be caused by reliance on goodwill trust, e.g. relying more 




The model that we developed here is well-suited to incremental innovation (Abernathy 1978) in industries 
with integral product architectures (Jacobides et al. 2016). While this makes the boundary conditions of the 
model clear, comparing our findings with those of studies from different industry settings (e.g. radical 
innovation and/or modular product architectures) could lead to more context-sensitive insights into 
ambidexterity (Lavie et al. 2010). More work is needed on broader industrial trends where inter-industry 
boundaries are becoming ill-defined, a typical example of which is the Internet of Things (Porter and 
Heppelmann 2015). In such a setting, new relationships with unconventional suppliers might suddenly 
become a source of innovation, while relationships with existing long-standing suppliers might inhibit the 
elaboration of dynamic capabilities (Schreyögg and Sydow 2010). This suggests the importance of 
redefining the concept of boundaries to include “both closed and open contexts” (Benner and Tushman 2015, 
p. 498) when analyzing ambidexterity across multiple levels, including both intra- and inter-organizational 
relationships. 
This also highlights another important limitation of this study, i.e. the exclusive focus on relationships 
with long-standing suppliers. In the future, we need to consider more self-supporting relationships with new 
suppliers from different industries. In fact, Toyota has recently paid greater attention to new technology 
areas, such as Integrated Safety Management and Intelligent Transport Systems (Toyota Motor Corporation 
2014). This could imply a shift to more radical innovations and business models beyond the traditional 
confines of the automotive industry, for example collaborations with IT suppliers and public infrastructure 
providers. We need to carefully observe to what extent the model that we have laid out here can be 
compatible with these new innovation contexts. Another important avenue for future research is to develop 
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a framework that brings both the close and long-standing, as well as the heterogeneous and self-supporting 
buyer-supplier relationships to the fore, and analyzes how buying firms can strike a balance between 
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Table 1 Average profit ratio and sales growth ratio in 2003-2014 















Profit ratio 4.6% 2.1% 2.5% 2.7% 2.5% 1.4% 
Sales growth ratio  157% 147% 136% 198% 170% 134% 
Japanese carmakers: Daihatsu, Fuji Heavy Industries, Honda, Mazda, Mitsubishi Motor, Nissan, Suzuki. 
Western carmakers: BMW, Ford, General Motors, Mercedes-Benz Cars, PSA, Renault, Volkswagen. 
Toyota suppliers: Aichi Steel, Aisin AW, Aisin Seiki, Denso, JTEKT, Koito Manufacturing, Tokai Rika, Toyoda Gosei, 
Toyota Boshoku, Toyota Industries (auto sector). 
Japanese suppliers: CalsonicKansei, Jatoco, Kahin, KYB, NSK (auto sector), NTN, Sumitomo Electric Industries (auto 
sector), Takata, TS-Tech, Yazaki. 
Western suppliers: Bosch (auto sector), Dana, Delphi, Faurecia, Johnson Controls (auto sector), Lear, Magna 







Table 2  Interviews and plant tours 
  No. of interviews Interviewees' roles Interview locations No. of plant tours 
Toyota 38 CE, CP, HR, LG, PC, P, PD, PI,  PU, Q, S J, A, C, E, I 13 
Supplier 1 43 CE, CP, HR, P, PD, PI, PT, PU, J, A, C, E, I 15 
Supplier 2 27 CE, CP, HR, P, PD, PT, PU, S J, A, C, E 5 
Supplier 3 17 CE, CP, HR, P, PC, PD, Q, S A, C, E, I 4 
Supplier 4 11 CE, CP, P, PT J, C 3 
Supplier 5 9 CE, P, PD, PI E, I 2 
Supplier 6 9 CE, HR, PI, PR, Q J, C, E 2 
Supplier 7 6 CE, P, PD J, E 1 
Supplier 8 4 CE, CP, PD, S A 1 
Supplier 9 3 CE, PD, S E 
 
Supplier 10 3 CP J 
 
Supplier 11 2 CE, P E 
 
Supplier 12 2 CE J 
 
Total 174     46 
Abbreviation: CE: Corporate Executive, CP: Corporate Planning, HR: Human Resources, LG: Logistics, P: Production, 
PC: Production Control, PD: Product Development, PI: Process Improvement, PT: Production Technology, PU: 
Purchase, Q: Quality, S: Sales, J: Japan, A: America, C: China, E: Europe, I: India. 
Note: We decided not to make clear what products suppliers mainly produce for Toyota in order to ensure anonymity. 
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Table 3-1 Key findings from the mass-production phase 
Themes First-order concepts Representative quotes 
Managing the control-autonomy trade-off 
Explicitness in 




Giving clear quality 
targets 
“Quality measures include ppm, on-line defect rates, and quality audit performance. Every day 
we take 10 vehicles and do a real deep analysis of those vehicles for everything, shipping quality 
performance... So suppliers who have zero, zero, zero, zero are better performing quality 
suppliers” (PU, Toyota). 
Performance 
evaluation by KPIs 
“We have a supplier evaluation system in the area of SQDC [safety, quality, development, cost]. 
Key performance indicators are set in each area. The quality target is less than (...) ppm.  We 
evaluate whether a supplier achieved the KPIs or not” (PU, Toyota).  
Formulating price cut 
(gentei) requests  
“Every six months Toyota negotiates a price with its 450 suppliers in Japan including Kyohokai 
[the name of Toyota’s supplier association] members… In the past few years it has demanded 
suppliers to lower prices by about 1% per year” (Nihon Keizai Shimbun [Nikkei Newspaper] 
2014, p. 1)  
Difficulty for suppliers 
to meet gentei targets 
“Part prices have been lowered in every project in the US. Besides that we receive gentei 
requests [from Toyota] once per year… Our basic strategy is to reduce labor and material costs 
without lowering quality. It is not easy to do in the US where it is difficult to find adequate 
materials” (P, Supplier 8).     






to ask “why”-questions 
and explore root 
causes 
“I ask suppliers where the problem is, when quality problems occur... Just creating a manual and 
adding a check-process is not enough as preventive measures. They need to pay attention to 
problem solving methods at a deeper level. They need to ask themselves: Why did the worker 
skip the checking? What is the real reason behind this?”  (Q, Toyota). 
Teaching basics but let 
suppliers choose 
learning focus 
“(…)-san [a Toyota’s QC expert] comes to our plant to teach us some basics [on problem 
solving] for half a day… Toyota encourages us to create our own themes, and lets us do whatever 




“There is very little in the Toyota TEAM activity [a supplier development activity organized by 
its European supplier association] that is directly implemented by Toyota. There is much more 
emphasis on the suppliers themselves to learn from each other, to share best practices with each 
other, and particularly to develop some of the systems and ways of thinking from each other” (P, 





“We started our QC circles after joining Toyota’s QC initiative [in the UK]. Cell leaders and 
group leaders on the shop-floor play a central role… We want to teach shop-floor operators how 
kaizen makes their jobs easier, and can make them happy… In doing so we attempt to gradually 








“If purchasing staff requests part prices that are too low, engineering staff would raise an alarm. 
Toyota has a mutual monitoring system between purchasing, engineering, and production… If 
engineering staff confronts suppliers with technical requirements that are too high, purchasing 
staff raises an alarm” (CP, Supplier 1).  
Supplier support 
activity separated from 
gentei 
“We have a joint project with Toyota to improve our surface finishing process. Toyota helps us 
to reduce costs in this process by jointly discussing how to make its marginal condition clear [for 
avoiding excessive costs for quality], which is helpful for us to reduce costs… In this project, 
Toyota says that it doesn't ask us to lower the part price as a result of this project” (CP, Supplier 
10).  
Supplier support from 
a holistic perspective 
“We provide aid not only to improve areas that produce parts for Toyota, but also to other areas 
that need to be improved. Our purpose is to raise the level of the company as a whole. Certainly, 
our main aim is to improve production lines that produce Toyota’s parts, but we recommend our 
suppliers to introduce the improved results to other production lines [for other customers] as 
well.” (Head of Supplier Support Center, Toyota). 
Emerging category 
Requisite security  Negotiability of cost 
reduction targets 
(gentei) 
“Toyota considers our production volume and material costs. Toyota understands the actual 
potential for cost reduction. [A Western customer] sometimes doesn’t care about the actual 
potential, they just ask us to reduce costs by 5%. Toyota always considers all factors in the 
negotiation process.” (CP, Supplier 1).  
Precise requirements 
but generous support 
“Regarding Toyota I can say ‘precise requirements and generous support’. If we have a problem, 
Toyota always comes to our rescue in the end. This enables us to solve the same problem by 
ourselves next time, and establish a competitive position” (CE, Supplier 11).  
  Listening to suppliers’ 
opinions  
“One European carmaker ordered us to fix the part because it did not meet the development 
standard, even though it has never caused a problem... When we told Toyota; ‘this part has never 
caused a problem, even though it does not meet your standard’; Toyota amended its standard 
after they checked whether it was ok for them or not.” (Q, Supplier 4). 
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Table 3-2 Key findings from the product development phase 
 
Themes First-order concepts Representative quotes 
Managing the control-autonomy trade-off 




Going beyond explicit 
requirements  
“We started with a small project with [new] suppliers. We teach them that it is 
insufficient to only meet our written criteria if they want to expand business with 
Toyota. However, Toyota will give them other information that is not in the written 
criteria” (PD, Toyota). 
Avoiding only a directive 
relationship with suppliers 
“Some suppliers have excellent capabilities in terms of technology, quality and cost. We 
need a system that encourages suggestions from such suppliers. We don’t want to 
establish only a directive relationship with suppliers that would prevent us from getting 
good ideas from suppliers” (PU, Toyota).  
Suppliers' feedback for 
improving Toyota's 
design drawings 
“Japanese suppliers don’t just develop parts, regardless of the quality of design 
drawings given by carmakers. We actually make suggestions to Toyota on how the 
design drawings can be improved to meet Toyota’s quality standard” (CE, Supplier 3).  
Suppliers' efforts beyond 
explicit targets 
“It sometimes happens that our part does not fit, even though the part lies within the 
design tolerance range. In this case our production division starts with fine-tuning 
between our part and Toyota's auto-body autonomously [instead of asking Toyota to 
change its design drawings and pay for additional costs]” (CE, Supplier 2). 





Standardization of the 
development process 
“Toyota standardizes recurring elements in the development process in the Toyota 
Standard (TS) and the Design Standard (DS). The TS is an engineering standard that 
includes the design process, evaluation criteria, and materials used … Suppliers need to 
follow the TS” (PD, Toyota). 
Transparent development 
processes 
“Japanese carmakers do not only ask us to conduct this test and to submit that document 
at a certain point of time, but make the whole system including software and philosophy 
transparent to us. This is true for Toyota, Honda and Nissan” (CE, Supplier 4).  
Suppliers’ internal 
functional coordination  
“When problems occur on the shop-floor which are caused not only by manufacturing 
but also design issues, our president sends design engineers to the plant floor and asks 
them to stay there until the problem is solved… Engineers need to better reflect 
manufacturing issues into the design drawings if they want to avoid that” (CE, Supplier 







solving with suppliers 
(obeya) 
“Toyota always stresses the importance of joint efforts among sales, production, 
engineering, and suppliers. We believe that we cannot develop a good car without these 
efforts… If there are any problems, people from engineering, quality, purchasing, 
suppliers, product development, sales get together in a room, and make a joint decision. 
We call this obeya [big room] activity” (CE, Toyota).    
Aligned PD system 
between Toyota and 
suppliers 
“Our job differs from just creating design drawings for Toyota. We plan which product 
would be good for Toyota, create a proposal, and actually develop the product... We 
have the same development system as Toyota… We have SE [simultaneous 
engineering] activities where our suppliers and gemba [manufacturing] people [from 
this supplier] come together, and incorporate gemba outcomes into design drawings” 
(PD, Supplier 3).  
Information sharing with 
suppliers 
“The information we want to obtain from the customer is the performance results for the 
whole system that our part goes into… We have only developed a relationship that 
share such information with Toyota. After jointly developing a system part with Toyota, 
we are allowed to sell this part to other makers” (S, Supplier 2).   
Emerging category 
Requisite security Giving suppliers 
opportunities to use their 
investments for upcoming 
models  
“Our Japanese suppliers understand keiretsu [the value of longstanding relationships]. 
They make great efforts for the current model project, which will be considered for 
upcoming models [even though they are not successful in the current model]” (PD, 
Toyota).   
Allowing suppliers to 
continue working on 
targets for future models 
“[Regarding CCC21’s 30% cost reduction], Toyota allowed us to achieve the target 
until the launch of the next car model, and adopted our part even though that part had 
not met the target at that time” (CE, Supplier 3).  
Providing advice to 
suppliers for upcoming 
models  
“Toyota’s purchasing sometimes takes our side when we face difficulty [to earn the 
trust of other divisions in Toyota]. They advise us on how to persuade Toyota’s design 
to adopt our parts, and which point should be improved first and so on” (Q, Supplier 4). 
  Making suppliers feel 
secure to invest in a long-
term relationship with 
Toyota 
“Since we feel secure in doing business with Toyota over a long period, we can allocate 
many of our resources for Toyota, dedicate a lot of our engineers to Toyota. Of course, 
we don't have a solid guarantee that Toyota will purchase our parts in the future, but we 
feel secure in doing business with Toyota” (CP, Supplier 1). 
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Bringing long- and 
short-term benefits
Outcome




Bringing long- and 
short-term benefits 
Supporting
- Concomitance between exploration and exploitation
- Continuous improvement not only for buying-firms but
also for suppliers themselves
countervail ing the risk of an overemphasis on one side 
Observation 2a                           Observation 2b
